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Abstract. Separation between processes on top of an operating system
or between guests in a virtualized environment is essential for establish-
ing security on modern platforms. A key requirement of the underlying
hardware is the ability to support multiple partitions executing on the
shared hardware without undue interference. For modern processor archi-
tectures - with hardware support for memory management, several modes
of operation and I/O interfaces - this is a delicate issue requiring deep
analysis at both instruction set and processor implementation level. In a
first attempt to rigorously answer this type of questions we introduced
in previous work an information flow analysis of user program execution
on an ARMv7 platform with hardware supported memory protection,
but without I/O. The analysis was performed as a semi-automatic proof
search procedure on top of an ARMv7 ISA model implemented in the
Cambridge HOL4 theorem prover by Fox et al. The restricted platform
functionality, however, makes the analysis of limited practical value. In
this paper we add support for devices, including DMA, to the analy-
sis. To this end, we propose an approach to device modeling based on
the idea of executing devices nondeterministically in parallel with the
(single-core) deterministic processor, covering a fine granularity of inter-
actions between the model components. Based on this model and tak-
ing the ARMv7 ISA as an example, we provide HOL4 proofs of several
noninterference-oriented isolation properties for a partition executing in
the presence of devices which potentially use DMA or interrupts.
Keywords: peripheral devices, DMA, separation, isolation, user mode execu-
tion, ARM, formal hardware/software co-verification, theorem proving, HOL4
1 Introduction
Modern computing platforms usually execute multiple kinds of services together.
Entertainment software runs next to online-banking applications. Personal com-
munication services run next to business software. For security, there is a strong
need to execute processes in isolation from each other, such that mutual influ-
ence is minimized and their integrity and confidentiality fully protected. Some
approaches attempt to achieve this level of isolation within the commodity op-
erating system, while others base upon separation kernels, micro kernels or vir-
tualization. In all cases, the hardware platform is required to allow for strong
compartmentalization of process execution. Untrusted processes should neither
be able to influence processes at higher trust levels nor to learn anything about
their state of execution. Basic protection is enabled by several privilege rings of
operation and memory protection/management units (MPU/MMU), controlled
by control registers, coprocessors and configurations in memory. Information can
potentially flow via multiple system components and operations, such as memory
accesses by the CPU, directly accessible registers, side effects of control regis-
ters, coprocessors, timing channels, device ports, device accesses to memory, or
interrupts, to just name a few. Therefore it is crucial to understand and docu-
ment the information flows that are possible on a complex platform. These flows
are not always obvious. For example, on some x86 processors it is possible for
low-privilege code to overwrite higher privilege code by writing to an address
that usually refers to the video card [5]. To enable this attack, it suffices to flip a
configuration bit usually accessible from the low privilege level. On ARM, com-
parison instructions change flags in the current program status register (CPSR).
When switching processes, those flags therefore need to be cleared or reloaded
from the register bank of the invoked process. Peripheral devices further increase
a system’s complexity. Assigning them to only one process per device is some-
times insufficient to prevent information flow between processes. If a device has
the capability of performing direct memory access (DMA), it can be programmed
to circumvent the access policy of the MMU unless advanced hardware support
for virtualization is provided and this support is soundly configured, which is
by no means self-evident. Even if the configuration of DMA controllers is mon-
itored to prevent copying between partitions, undesired information flows can
still occur. For example, a device can fire an interrupt depending on the content
of memory controlled by a user process, allowing for side channel communication
based on the delays introduced by such interrupts. Given the complexity of mod-
ern hardware, it is not trivial to avoid misconfiguration. In previous work [10] we
introduced a formal information flow analysis of ARMv7 user mode execution on
instruction set architecture (ISA) level, however, not yet covering devices. With
devices, the system’s state increases and so does the set of possible information
flows. CPU and multiple DMA devices with unknown behaviour can execute in
parallel, possibly accessing the same memory, with an unknown interleaving.
This paper presents the following contributions. First, we extend the Cam-
bridge HOL4 model of the ARM architecture [7] by a general device framework.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first theorem prover model for de-
vices capable of reasoning on DMA. It is sufficiently detailed to capture possible
information flows on modern systems. The adaptation to other processor ar-
chitectures can be done with a minor effort. Second, we identify several secure
device configurations. Since the focus is on platform information flow security
rather than functionality, we do not restrict verification to concrete device spec-
ifications, but provide a suitable abstraction. For the verification of a system’s
separation properties, it is then sufficient to show that the configuration of the
system devices complies with the identified abstract requirements. Finally, based
on the proposed configurations and the device framework, we prove the following
partitioning-related properties of the ARMv7 architecture with devices:
1. Non-infiltration states that the user mode execution of an ARMv7 processor
is independent of devices that neither write to the memory accessed by the
active process nor fire interrupts.
2. The integrity property of extended non-exfiltration states in turn that user
mode processes are unable to influence devices that do not read from CPU-
modifiable memory. Moreover, other protected resources3, such as memory
of neighboring processes, can not be modified by the process. That is true
even if dedicated peripheral devices do access these resources in parallel.
More specifically, the transformation of these resources depends only on such
dedicated and inaccessible devices.
3. The third property, filtered device non-infiltration, states that devices which
operate on disjunct resources can not influence each other without the in-
teraction of the CPU.
One of the added challenges in the formulation and verification of the prop-
erties compared to [10] is that - with CPU and devices operating in parallel
- different principles can cause different effects on the shared state. Covering
separation during user mode execution, the results can be applied in the verifi-
cation of hypervisors, separation kernels and operating systems. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work on non-interference like platform properties
for autonomous device execution.
2 Related Work
Hillebrand et al. [9] describe a pen and paper model, later formalized in Is-
abelle/HOL [1], for a memory-mapped hard disk integrated with a RISC archi-
tecture. The model includes side effects on device port reads/writes, interrupts
and an external environment. The latter is also used to realize non-determinism,
especially in timing matters. Direct memory access is not covered. Furthermore,
unlike ARM, the processor model does not perform multiple memory operations
per instruction (instruction fetches are assumed to not refer to device ports),
which allows for executing processor and device steps in an interleaved way after
one another, without considering device progress within a single processor step.
3 See Section 6.3 for the complete list of protected resources.
In [1] they describe the exploitation of an oracle that enables the sequentializa-
tion of the concurrent execution of devices and CPU. While the concrete order
of events in a system is hard to predict, this oracle allows for the quantification
over all execution orders and external inputs. These results were applied in the
functional correctness verification of a microkernel [2]. The system architecture
includes concurrent devices; besides a hard disk used for page fault handling also
devices accessible by user processes are considered. Using refinement techniques,
the authors were able to establish a simulation relation between an abstract
microkernel programming framework and the instruction level. On the abstract
levels devices are represented as ghost data structures.
Duan and Regehr [4] describe a general device model framework integrated
with the HOL4 model for ARM6 by Anthony Fox [6] in a lock-step manner. They
provide a proof of concept for a UART device and its driver, presenting state-
ments on functionality, (memory) safety and timing. Similar to [9] and [1], they
model side effects of memory mapped accesses to device ports and exploit input
streams. Again, DMA is not supported. The authors prove that the integration of
new devices to the system does not cause new undefined behaviour and preserves
already established system predicates. This allows to verify driver correctness for
one device at a time, but clearly would not hold for DMA devices. In his PhD
thesis [3], Duan integrates his model into the Cambridge model of ARMv7 and
adds reasoning about interrupts. Since ARMv7 has instructions that perform
multiple memory accesses, device port reads/writes have been integrated into
the primitives for memory accesses. Also autonomous device transitions are in-
tegrated into the execution cycle, however, they occur only once per instruction.
In a DMA setting this is not sufficient since physical memory can be changed
by devices between two memory accesses from the CPU side. In order to reason
about DMA with a finer granularity and to allow for non-deterministic device
progress, we propose a different model in Section 5.
Monniaux modelled a USB controller in C and used an extended version
of the Astrée static analyzer to verify that neither controller nor its driver will
transfer data incorrectly [11]. He includes asynchronous DMA into his reasoning.
By modelling the controller’s behaviour with non-deterministic choices, an over-
approximation is achieved. Isolation from untrusted software is not discussed.
XMHF [12] is a hypervisor framework for x86 exploiting virtualization sup-
port, in particular the DMA protection of Intel Vt-d and AMD’s device exclusion
vectors. The framework allows unmodified guests direct device access. System
devices are included in the attacker model. Exploiting the model checker CBMC,
mainly memory integrity is verified. As for direct memory access, CBMC verifies
that the control register value written to the DMA protection hardware register
has the bit set which enables DMA protection. The DMA table is manually au-
dited. However, it seems that the actual effects of devices or the DMA protection
unit are not part of the model. In the present paper we focus on systems without
hardware support for virtualization.
arm_state = < | psrs : PSRName→ ARMpsr;
regs : RName→ word32;
memory : word32→ word8;
coproc : coprocessors;
accesses : memory_accesslist;
misc : Monitors # ARMinfo # bool # bool | >;
Fig. 1. The ARM state in HOL4
The properties shown in this paper are inspired by Heitmeyer et al. [8], who
formulated non-infiltration and non-exfiltration for a separation kernel. We adapt
those properties to a platform with DMA devices and a CPU in user mode.
3 The HOL4 ARM Model
We base our work on Fox et al’s monadic HOL4 ISA model [7] of ARMv7 plat-
forms without hardware extensions such as TrustZone or virtualization support.
Figure 1 shows a simplified definition of the processor state in this model. The
function psrs returns the value of a processor state register (of type ARMpsr).
The processor state registers include the current program status register, CPSR,
in addition to the banked psrs SPSR_m for each privileged mode m, except for sys-
tem mode. The ARMv7 core provides seven processor modes: one non-privileged
user mode usr, and six privileged modes, activated when an exception (such as
an interrupt) is invoked. The function regs takes a register name and returns its
value. The ARM registers include sixteen general purpose registers (r0− r15)
that are available from all modes in addition to the banked registers of each priv-
ileged mode that are available only in that mode. The function memory maps an
address (word32) to a byte (word8). Caches are not represented in the model. The
field coproc represents the set of coprocessor registers in CP14 and CP15 implic-
itly influencing execution, to a large extent even user-mode/exception execution.
The field misc represents exclusive monitors for synchronization purposes, gen-
eral information about the state, e.g. the architecture version, if the system is
waiting for an interrupt etc, and accesses records the accesses to the memory.
A computation in the monadic HOL4 ARM model is a term of the type
α M = arm_state 7→ (α, arm_state) error_option
where error_option is a datatype defined as:
(α, β) error_option = ValueState of α ⇒ β | Error of string
Computations act on a state (arm_state) and return either ValueState a s, a
new state s along with a return value a of type α, or an error e (if the computation
is underspecified by the ARM specification). The monad unit constT injects a
value into a computation, i.e. constT a s = ValueState a s, while binding is a
sequential composition operation
f1 =e f2 = λs.case f1 s of Error c → Error c
| ValueState a s′ → if e s′ then f2 a s′ else f1 s.
That is, if e holds in the final state of f1, the return value of f1 is passed to f2 as
the input parameter, otherwise f2 is not executed. In addition to unit and bind-
ing, the ARM monadic specification uses standard constructs for lambda, full
conditional, let, and case, as well as the monad operations parallel composition,
positive conditional (condT e f = if e then f else constT ()), error (errorT a =
Error a), and an iterator. Values of state components can be obtained and set by
readT f = λy.(ValueState (f y) y) and writeT f = λy.(ValueState () (f y)).
4 Memory Management
The Memory Management Unit (MMU) enforces memory access policies and
is therefore crucial for isolation. MMU configurations consist of page tables in
memory and dedicated registers of CP15. Specific to ARM is the possibility of
partitioning pages into collections of memory regions (domains), each represent-
ing one security role. The coprocessor registers involved are SCTLR, TTBR0 and
DACR. The SCTLR register determines whether the MMU is enabled, TTBR0 con-
tains the base address of the page table, and DACR manages the ARM domains.
In [10] we extended the ARM model with MMU functionality. The extended
model defines two key functions, permitted, to account for access permissions,
and mmu_setup, to reflect a “good configuration” property. The permission eval-
uation function permitted a bw (vs, vt, vd) bp m takes as parameters an address
a, a flag bw indicating whether reading or writing access is to be evaluated, the
values of SCTLR, TTBR0 and DACR, a flag bp indicating whether permissions are to
be checked against a privileged mode, and the memory m containing the page
tables. The pair of booleans returned by permitted states whether the access
permission on the specified location is defined in the given configuration, and
the outcome of that decision (true if access is granted). Here, we apply a basic
version of permitted, supporting one-level page tables with an identity address
translation, but including the interpretation of ARM domains. It is shown that
permitted is defined for all addresses in all reachable states.
The history of memory accesses is tracked in the accesses ghost field of
the machine state, allowing to compute the set of memory locations accessed
by an instruction. To stop computation after the first access violation, =nav
has been chosen as standard binding operator. The property nav s holds if there
is no access violation recorded in state s. Formally, this is the case if there is
no entry in the access list of machine state s that causes permitted to return
a negative answer in the current configuration of s. The recording of an access
always happens before the access itself.
We finally need to formulate a suitable well-formedness condition for the
MMU configuration. Let accessible i a express that address a is readable and
writable by user process i. Other, more refined, static user level access policies
can be supported with minor effort. The predicate mmu_setup i s holds if (i) the
MMU configuration ((d, p) = permitted a bw (mmu_registers s) ⊥ s.memory)
for any address a and access type bw is defined (i.e., d is true), (ii) the state
s implements the desired access policy for process i (i.e., p = accessible i a),
and (iii) none of the active page tables in s (represented by the address set
page_table_adds s) is accessible according to the policy.
mmu_setup i s :=
∀a,w, d, p. ((d, p) = permitted a bw (mmu_registers s) ⊥ s.memory)
⇒ d ∧ (p = accessible i a) ∧ (a ∈ (page_table_adds s)⇒ ¬accessible i a)
For the properties shown in Section 6 we furthermore prohibit user space pro-
cesses to access device ports by assuming that the (state-independent) set of
device addresses and accessible addresses are disjoint for every user process.
5 Device Model Framework
We present a general device model framework, capable of reasoning on DMA
devices and with the ambition to cover all possible executions of a platform
where the single-core processor and multiple devices run in parallel. In practice,
changes to shared resources such as memory happen asynchronously and in a
practically unpredictable order. We apply a non-deterministic approach that
takes into account all possible interleavings and - to be conservative on timing
behaviour - all possible durations of device and CPU actions, without restrictions
on deadlines. Naturally, this does not allow to reason on whether an operation
will be finished before a certain event or not. A timing accurate model would need
to take CPU and system implementation specific details into account, including
caches, MMU implementation specifics (such as the translation lookaside buffer),
pipeline architecture and bus contention protocols. Models at this level of detail
are surely interesting, but likely to be vastly more complex. The main challenge
when integrating DMA into a device model is that memory can potentially
change at any time, for example, between reading two words belonging to a
multiple load instruction. Also inter-device communication can occur in any
order and granularity. This precludes models that synchronize CPU and devices
only between different CPU instructions. To address this challenge and allow for
asynchronous device execution, we augment the CPU model with an abstract
scheduler as suggested in [1], an oracle of the type
oracle : num→ (dev_name # word32 option) option
The oracle provides a non-deterministic sequence of activity entries where
the n-th activity entry oracle n is either NONE (then the CPU is progressed
rather than a device) or a tuple SOME (d, eiopt), indicating the device with iden-
tifier (dev_name) d to progress one step, possibly in the context of the op-
tional external 32-bit input eiopt. We assume processor liveness: ∀n. ∃m. (m ≥
n) ∧ (oracle m = NONE). Liveness of devices can be optionally included, but is
not required for the properties we show in this paper. To include devices into
the machine state, arm_state is extended by the following components:
devices : dev_rec;
ext_out : dev_name→ word32 list;
int_fired : bool;
counter : num
The record devices subsumes the states of all devices 4. The external output is
represented by a finite stream of 32-bit words for each device, accessible via the
map ext_out, mapping each device identifier to the list of outputs produced
so far for that device. Whether an interrupt has been fired during the current
execution cycle is stored in int_fired. Fast interrupts or advanced interrupt
controllers are not part of the model. Finally, counter points to the current
position in the oracle index and is incremented every time the oracle is invoked.
Devices can progress in one of four ways:
– Autonomously : A device may make processor-independent progress, either by
entirely internal actions or by receiving external inputs, accessing memory,
raising interrupts, or producing external outputs. The function
progress : device 7→ (word32 option)
7→ (mem_req option # bool # word32 option # device) option
takes as arguments a device state D and a possible external input eiopt.
It returns either an "error" (NONE) representing undefined behaviour or a
tuple (ropt, bint, eoopt, D′) with an optional read/write access request ropt to
the system’s memory bus (including an address and the access type), a flag
bint indicating a possible interrupt, an optional external output eoopt and the
updated device stateD′. This function is used to progress devices with a non-
deterministic frequency after every executed CPU instruction and between
memory accesses made by the CPU or other devices.
– Upon reception of a pending reply to a memory bus read : As a result of an
autonomous step, a device can send a read request to the bus, in order to
read from the system memory or from the port of another device. The result
is communicated to the device by invoking the receive operation:
receive : device 7→ mem_req 7→ mem_answer 7→ device option
For a given device state D and request r being answered, receive D r v
passes the read value v (as either byte or word) to D and returns either
an error (NONE) or the updated device D′. Write operations requested by
devices do not have an answer and thus change only the memory, but not
the device. We assume that reads are atomic operations and the memory
bus will always complete an issued read before handling new operations. In
other words, we exclude scenarios where a device notices that one of its ports
is being read and already starts side effect computations affecting memory
or other system components without first returning the requested value.
4 We notate devices.d for the state of the device with identifier d in the record
devices.
advance_single f n := readT (λs. s.devices)=T
(λDˆ. (case oracle n of NONE⇒ constT ()
|SOME (d, eiopt)⇒
condT (f d)
(case progress Dˆ.d eiopt of NONE⇒ errorT 
|SOME (ropt, bint, eoopt, D′)⇒
update_device d D′ =T
(λu. update_output d eoopt =T
(λu. condT bint
(writeT (λs. s with int_fired := T))=T
(λu. case ropt of NONE⇒ constT ()
|SOME r ⇒ mem_acc_by_dev r d)))))=T
(λu. increment_counter))
Fig. 2. The advance_single computation.
That is no limitation for the properties we show in this paper, since we do
not consider port accesses in them. As for reads from physical memory, for
any race condition outcome there is always one initiation of the oracle that
represents this outcome within the model.
– As side effect on port reads: The CPU or another device may read from an
address that is mapped to a device. This address can belong to a device
register, but in general it is not required that such a register is physically
existing, for example when the address is associated with a side effect. We
therefore use the general term port rather than register. We assume atomic
32-bit accesses to device ports and that port accesses are not cached. The
function
d_read : device 7→ word32 7→ (word32 # device) option
takes as arguments a device state D and the port number indicating which
port of the device is to be read. A special data structure of the model maps
any virtual address to either physical memory or a device identifier together
with a port number. The result of d_read is either NONE or the read 32-bit
value together with a possibly updated device state D′.
– As side effect on port writes: the function
d_write : device 7→ word32 7→ word32 7→ device option
takes as arguments a device state D, the port number indicating which port
of the device is to be written to and the 32-bit value to be written. It returns
either an error (NONE) or the updated device state D′.
Different types of devices will have different behaviour. That is, the concrete
functionalities of the device functions depend on the addressed device. While
d_write and d_read are integrated into the existing memory access primitives
of the ARM model (similar to [3]), progress and receive are used to realize
autonomous progress of devices. Figure 2 defines advance_single f n that uses
the oracle at position n to determine the next device to progress autonomously
and that updates the state with the effect of this progress accordingly. Subse-
quently, resulting memory requests are realized (including possible side effects
when directed to other devices) and finally counter is increased. A filtering pred-
icate f can be used to apply those steps only to devices d for which f d holds.
Here, update_device and update_output update the devices and ext_out
components of the current state, respectively, and mem_acc_by_dev r d real-
izes the memory access request r on behalf of device d. Our model does not
include any IOMMU. The repeated execution of advance_single is realized
by advance, where for n > 0, advance f n traverses the oracle with filtering
predicate f up to oracle position n and advance f 0 traverses the oracle until a
NONE as activity entry indicates that execution will continue on the CPU side.
The advance computation will synchronize devices and CPU before each mem-
ory bus access (for memory mapped ports and physical memory) of the CPU5
and additionally between two execution cycles. The model supports instruction
fetching from device addresses, but we assume that page table walks are not
performed on device ports. In the properties shown in this paper we assume
an MMU setting that prohibits both, by choosing device addresses, page table
addresses and user space accessible memory to be disjoint.
Incorporating the MMU and device extension, the instruction execution func-
tion next (Fig. 3) involves the following functionality: if an interrupt is pending
and not masked, an interrupt exception is taken. Otherwise, the CPU may (if re-
quested so by the previous instruction) wait for an interrupt or fetch and execute
the next instruction pointed to by the program counter. If an access violation
is recorded during instruction fetching or execution, a prefetch or data abort
exception is initiated. The access list is cleared between the single steps and
unconditional binding =T is used occasionally, preventing the execution from
halting and instead allowing the initiation of exceptions and the detection of pos-
sible further violations. In addition to the synchronization phases before any of
the CPU’s memory operations, possible autonomous device steps are considered
after each instruction execution, in order to account for interrupt initiations.
As discussed earlier, our model is not clock accurate. While this is common
with related work, usually a fixed duration is assumed for all instructions [3].
In our model, durations are non-deterministic, controlled by the oracle. How-
ever, given a specific oracle sequence, memory extensive instructions generally
consume more oracle entries (i.e, time). For the properties of this paper and the
targeted abstraction level, concrete instruction time is not relevant.
6 Security Properties
We next turn to formalizing several partitioning properties in terms of non-
infiltration and non-exfiltration (cf. [8]), adapted to our setting, i.e., arbitrary
5 Consequently, accesses to the shared state, in particular the memory bus, determine
the granularity of the system.
next := (clear_alist=
(λu. readT (λs. s.int_fired ∧ ¬s.psrs(0, CPSR).I) =
(λb. if (¬b) then
waiting_for_interrupt =
(λw. condT (¬w)
(fetch_instruction =T
(λ(o, i). is_viol =T (λa. clear_alist =
(λu. if a then prefetch_abort
else (execute i =T (λu. is_viol =T
(λa. condT a
(clear_alist =
(λu. data_abort)))))))))) =T
(λu. advance all 0)
else take_irq_exception = (λu. clear_interrupts))))
Fig. 3. The next computation.
and unknown user mode code executing on an ARMv7 CPU and in parallel
with DMA devices. The isolation does not rely on an IOMMU. Together with a
proper separation kernel (configuring devices, mediating user registers etc.) the
discussed properties allow for establishing full process isolation within a system.
6.1 Suitable Device Configurations
Since isolation between CPU and DMA devices requires controlled device be-
haviour, we first describe possible device configurations that we consider secure.
They allow the devices to change their internal state in an arbitrary way, but
impose restrictions on DMA and interrupts. Kernels are responsible for realiz-
ing such a device configuration, in order to guarantee that process isolation is
maintained when yielding to user mode. We expect those configurations to stay
preserved throughout the whole user mode execution (while access to device
ports is forbidden to both CPU and other devices). Formally, a configuration
C is called invariant if it is preserved over autonomous steps, including the
reception of replies to autonomously issued read requests:
invariant C := ∀D. C D ⇒
(∀eiopt, ropt, bint, eoopt, D′.
(progress D eiopt = SOME (ropt, bint, eoopt, D
′))⇒ C D′)
∧ (∀r, v, D′. (receive D r v = SOME D′)⇒ C D′)
A property P holds on a device D in a stable way if it is established by an
invariant configuration C:
stable P D := ∃C. invariant C ∧ C D ∧ (∀D′. C D′ ⇒ P D′)
The stable properties we are interested in guarantee that devices are configured
in a way that prevents them from communicating with other devices, running
into an undefined state, accessing memory out of well-defined boundaries or firing
interrupts in dependency on DMA operations. We believe that many devices
(e.g., timers or DMA controllers) can be configured to respect those restrictions.
The restricted_dma predicate holds if a device is configured to restrict its
DMA requests to a set A of memory addresses.
restricted_dma A D := ∀eiopt, r, bint, eoopt, D′.
(progress D eiopt = SOME (SOME r, bint, eoopt, D
′))⇒ (access_request_map r ⊆ A)
Here, access_request_map maps a memory request to the set of byte ad-
dresses it involves. A device is called silent if A does not include device ports.
Devices not firing interrupts are called interrupt_free. We say that a device is
errorfree, if progress and receive do not return NONE for any inputs. Based
on those properties, we distinguish three specific device configurations: devices
involving DMA operations on the memory of the active process, devices involv-
ing DMA operations on the memory of other processes, and devices that are
allowed to fire an interrupt.
own_devices i D := stable (restricted_dma (own_add i)) D
∧ stable interrupt_free D
foreign_devices i D := stable (restricted_dma (foreign_add i)) D
∧ stable interrupt_free D
interrupt_devices D := stable (restricted_dma empty_set) D
Here, own_add i is the set of addresses belonging to process or partition i, while
foreign_add i spans exactly over the other user partitions. We do not allow
a device to do both, accessing memory and firing interrupts. This is to prevent
information flow from a user process’ memory to another process’ perception of
execution time. 6 For a given user process i we assign each device d to one of three
classes, OWN i d, FOREIGN i d or INTERRUPT d, that correspond to the configura-
tions own_devices i D, foreign_devices i D and interrupt_devices D, re-
spectively. While configurations refer to a concrete device state D, device classes
are state-independent. We require that each device is in at least one of the three
classes. The system properties discussed in the following subsections have a cor-
rect configuration of the devices as a prerequisite. The configuration of each
device in the current state is supposed to follow the specification of the given
class. Moreover, devices are not allowed to communicate with other devices or
to run into an underspecified state.
device_setup i s := ∀d.
(OWN i d⇒ own_devices i s.devices.d)
∧ (FOREIGN i d⇒ foreign_devices i s.devices.d)
∧ (INTERRUPT d⇒ interrupt_devices s.devices.d)
∧ stable errorfree s.devices.d ∧ stable silent s.devices.d
6.2 Non-infiltration
Confidentiality of the kernel and neighboring user processes (including their
devices) and the integrity of the active user process is guaranteed by non-
6 Alternative configurations could allow DMA devices to fire interrupts, as long as
those interrupts are masked while foreign processes are executing. However, this
requires a very careful and more complex design at kernel level to avoid timing
channels when interrupts occur close to context switches.
Fig. 4. a.) non-infiltration, b.) extended non-exfiltration, c.) filtered device non-
infiltration
infiltration, a noninterference-like property at the user mode single instruction
level. Consider two machine states in user mode that are low equivalent in the
sense that the two states agree on the resources (devices, registers and mem-
ory) that are permitted to influence user mode execution, but do not necessarily
agree on other resources. Non-infiltration (Fig. 4.a) holds if the poststates, after
execution of one instruction, remain low equivalent (or produce the same error).
Theorem 1. Non-infiltration
∀s1, s2, i. (mode s1 = mode s2 = usr) ∧ mmu_setup i s1 ∧ mmu_setup i s2
∧ device_setup i s1 ∧ device_setup i s2 ∧ bisim i s1 s2
⇒ (∃t1, t2. (next s1 = ValueState () t1 ) ∧ (next s2 = ValueState () t2)
∧ bisim i t1 t2) ∨ (∃e. (next s1 = Error e) ∧ (next s2 = Error e))
The relation bisim is the low equivalence relation. User mode processes are al-
lowed to be influenced by the user mode registers, the memory assigned to them,
devices with access to that memory, interrupt devices, the CPSR, the coproces-
sors, pending access violations and the misc state component. Formally:
bisim i s1 s2 :=
(s1.counter = s2.counter) ∧ (s1.int_fired = s2.int_fired)
∧ equal_user_regs s1 s2 ∧ (∀a. accessible i a⇒ (s1.memory a = s2.memory a))
∧ (∀d. OWN i d ∨ INTERRUPT d
⇒ (s1.devices.d = s2.devices.d) ∧ (s1.ext_out d = s2.ext_out d))
∧ (s1.psrs(CPSR) = s2.psrs(CPSR)) ∧ (s1.coproc.state = s2.coproc.state)
∧ (nav s1 = nav s2) ∧ (s1.misc = s2.misc)
Non-infiltration guarantees that system components outside the bisim relation
can not give rise to information flow. In particular, privileged registers, memory
foreign to the current process and devices that operate on such memory can not
influence the execution on the CPU. External output has no impact on other
components either. However, it was included into the relation to obtain guaran-
tees on that information from the kernel and neighboring processes can not be
leaked through the system’s output, as long as the configuration of the devices
producing that output prevents them from accessing confidential memory.
6.3 Extended Non-exfiltration
Non-exfiltration guarantees the integrity of resources foreign to the active user
process. Given a valid configuration for user process i active, the execution of
a single instruction in user mode will not modify any other resources but those
considered to be modifiable by i. In [10] this was expressed by the equality
of protected components in pre- and poststate. However, when some of those
protected components are modified by devices executing in parallel, this equality
can not be proven. Therefore, we extend non-exfiltration to a triangle shaped
property (compare Fig. 4.b), in which the poststate t of a system-wide progress
is compared to both, the prestate s and a third state of comparison r that is the
result of applying only the effects of the device operations to the prestate.
Theorem 2. Extended Non-exfiltration
∀s, t, r, i. (mode s = usr) ∧ mmu_setup i s ∧ device_setup i s
∧ (next s = ValueState () t) ∧ (advance all t.counter s = ValueState () r)
⇒ intact i s t r
For synchronization, advance is applied up to the oracle counter state in post-
state t. The intact relation between the prestate s with active process i, the
poststate t and the comparison state r guarantees that coprocessors and memory
not belonging to any user process remain unchanged. The memory of neighbor-
ing user processes, new interrupts, and devices that do not access memory of
i, are determined by the device operations only. In particular, they can not be
influenced by writing to the memory of i. The only modifiable registers are the
CPSR, user mode registers, and the PSR and the link register of the mode in t.
intact i s t r :=
(t.coproc = s.coproc) ∧ (∀a.(∀j.¬accessible j a)⇒ (t.memory a = s.memory a))
∧ (∀a, j. (i 6= j) ∧ accessible j a⇒ (t.memory a = r.memory a))
∧ (t.int_fired = r.int_fired)
∧ (∀d. FOREIGN i d ∨ INTERRUPT d
⇒ (t.devices.d = r.devices.d) ∧ (t.ext_out d = r.ext_out d))
∧ (∀q. q /∈ accessible_regs (mode t)⇒ (t.regs(q) = s.regs(q)))
∧ (∀p. p /∈ {CPSR, spsr_(mode t)} ⇒ (t.psrs(p) = s.psrs(p)))
6.4 Filtered Device Non-Infiltration
In addition to the non-infiltration property of the overall system, we provide one
for device activities only. It can be combined with extended non-exfiltration to
guarantee that devices not accessing the active partition form their own group
of resources which executes independently from the CPU. Formally, filtered de-
vice non-infiltration (Fig. 4.c) states that devices configured to not access more
than the memory of active process i (devices d for which OWN i d holds) cannot
influence devices not operating on that memory. Consequently, when comparing
two systems and their executions, removing the activities of devices in the OWN
class from one of the executions (through the filtering predicate of advance) will
not change the effects that the other devices can observe.
Theorem 3. Filtered Device Non-Infiltration
f2 = (λd. f1 d ∧ ¬OWN i d) ∧ devsim i s1 s2
∧ device_setup i s1 ∧ (advance f1 n s = ValueState () t1)
∧ device_setup i s2 ∧ (advance f2 n s = ValueState () t2)
⇒ devsim i t1 t2
The devsim equivalence relation describes the resources visible to interrupt de-
vices and to devices that operate on memory of non-active user processes.
devsim i s1 s2 :=
(s1.counter = s2.counter) ∧ (s1.int_fired = s2.int_fired)
∧ (∀a, j. (i 6= j) ∧ accessible j a⇒ (s1.memory a = s2.memory a))
∧ (∀d. ¬OWN i d⇒ (s1.devices.d = s2.devices.d) ∧ (s1.ext_out d = s2.ext_out d))
7 Implementation
We proved the theorems of Section 6 for the ARMv7 platform inside HOL4. This
work extends the proof presented in [10], in which we showed non-infiltration,
non-exfiltration and mode switching properties for ARMv7 user mode execution
on ISA level without devices. Given the complexity of the ARM model and
the instruction set, we exploited automation based on a sound, but incomplete
inference system. For example, for two computations f and g that both preserve
non-infiltration, the inference rule for sequential composition derives that also
f nav g preserves non-infiltration. We have proven further rules for parallel
composition, loops, alternatives, lambda abstraction and other constructors of
the operational semantics. They enabled us to develop a proof tool for relational
and invariant reasoning that - after being provided with the desired properties for
primitive operations - was able to discharge large parts of the proof obligations
(but not all) automatically. Details are discussed in [10].
In the present extended work, the separation properties had to be proven
manually for advance, mainly because they would not hold for intermediate com-
putations in isolation. Due to the complexity, this was one of the main challenges.
We followed a bottom-up approach. Basic properties on mem_acc_by_dev, a
rather extensive case analysis and automatic simplification allowed for the veri-
fication of properties on advance_single. This step often required to split the
analysis into the effects on the device currently progressed by advance_single
and the effects on all other devices. Finally, properties for advance were proven
by induction. In order to allow for the continued application of the proof tool to
the existing parts, we had to verify the transitivity of advance. Subsequently, the
vast majority of the automatic proofs could be repeated without any interrup-
tions, which gives confidence that our proof framework scales well for extensions
of the platform model. The Cambridge model of ARM is 9 kLOC. In addition to
the ARM model, we rely mainly on the relatively small inference kernel of the
HOL4 theorem prover, our MMU extension (about 180 lines of definitions), the
device framework (about 350 lines) and the formulation of the discussed prop-
erties (about 380 lines). The entire proof script has a length of about 20 kLOC
and needs roughly two and a half hours to run on an Intel(R) Xeon(R) X3470
core at 2.9 GHz. We invested about five person months of effort into this work.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
We extended the Cambridge HOL4 ISA model for ARM by a general device
framework for DMA devices. Based on the extended model we identified secure
device configurations and proved several isolation properties for platforms where
DMA devices execute in parallel with a CPU in user mode. The results can be
used in separation proofs, be it in a hypervisor, separation kernel or operating
system setting. Model, properties and verification approach can be adapted to
other architectures. We gained confidence that our proof framework scales well
for extensions of the model. The model allows for further interesting angles,
which we plan to explore in future work: It is rather common that devices com-
municate with each other. So far, we can only support such constellations by
merging communicating devices into one block, so that the model understands
the block as a single device. Removing this restriction comes with the challenge of
ensuring that device configurations still remain secure when devices are allowed
to write to ports of other devices. Probably easier to achieve is the augmentation
of the set of device classes by devices that neither use DMA nor interrupts, but
that can be accessed by user space processes. A UART interface managed by a
single process is one such example. From a security perspective, such a device is
similar to physical memory assigned to a process, in spite of the self-modifying
nature and external influence that such components have. Even if devices (like
a timer) are shared between different user processes, user mode access to their
ports can still preserve isolation, for example, if that access is always reading.
Further potential future work includes the investigation of connected external
input/output channels or the enhancement of the model by an IOMMU.
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